Market Games and Successive Oligopolies by Jean J. GABSZEWICZ et al.
Département des Sciences Économiques
de l'Université catholique de Louvain
Market Games and Successive Oligopolies
J. Gabszewicz, D. Laussel, T. van Ypersele and S. Zanaj
Discussion  Paper   2007-9CORE Discussion paper 2007/10
Market games and successive oligopolies
J. Gabszewicz ∗ , D. Laussel † , T. van Ypersele ‡and S. Zanaj§
January 31, 2007
Abstract
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11 Introduction
In the traditional theory of successive markets, the property of double marginali-
sation has attracted the interest of scholars since its very discovery by Spengler
in 1950 (Spengler, 1950). This property says that, when the supply chain is
monopolised in each of the successive markets, the price of the ﬁnal product
embodies the monopoly unit margins arising in each of them . This theory
is cast assuming that ﬁrms, while behaving as monopolists in their own out-
put market, behave as price takers when buying their input. This assumption
implies a speciﬁc sequentiality in the ﬁrms’decisions: in the second stage, the
downstream monopolist selects the output level, conditional on the input price.
This choice generates a demand function for the input. The eﬀective input price
then obtains in the ﬁrst stage from the equality between the downstream mo-
nopolist’ s demand and the upstream monopolist’s input supply decision. This
supply decision is assumed to maximise the upstream monopolist’s proﬁt on
the demand function of the downstream monopolist, while taking the price of
his/her own input as given. This constitutes the traditional approach to present
the property of double marginalisation in the bilateral monopoly framework.
This approach has also been recently adopted by Gabszewicz and Zanaj
(2006) (henceforth G-Z) in their endeavor to analyse this property in the more
general framework of successive oligopolies. In the above paper, the authors
consider two successive markets embodying n and m ﬁrms, respectively. Firms in
these markets select non cooperatively ”` a la Cournot” the quantities of output
of the good they produce, the output of the m upstream ﬁrms serving as input
for the n downstream ones in the production of their own output. The link
between the two markets follows from the fact that the downstream ﬁrms’ unit
cost appears as the unit revenue for the upstream ones: the price paid for a unit
of input for the ﬁrms in the former constitutes the unit receipt for the ﬁrms in
the latter. In order to better understand how the eﬀects of entry in successive
markets depend on the input-transforming technology, the authors propose a
model which makes explicit how the downstream and upstream markets are
linked to each other via the production function used by the downstream ﬁrms
to transform the input into the output. They also investigate entry of new ﬁrms,
when entry obtains by expanding the economy. In particular, they highlight
through prototype examples the diﬀerentiated eﬀects of entry corresponding to a
constant, or decreasing returns, technology. They show for instance that, under
decreasing returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency
for the input price to adjust to its marginal cost, while it does under constant
returns. Again, this analysis is pursued along the traditional assumption that
ﬁrms, while behaving as oligopolists in their own output market, behave as price
takers when buying their input.
The present paper ﬁrst introduces an alternative approach to examine how
successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets.
This alternative approach relies on the notion of strategic market game1, and
1see, for instance, Shapley (1977, Shapley and Shubik (1977)) or Dubey and Shubik 1977).proposes the following timing of ﬁrms’ decisions. In the second stage, the n
downstream oligopolists play a Cournot game in the downstream market, and
bid each a quantity of money he/she is willing to oﬀer to get a share of the
total input supplied by the m upstream ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage. This choice
generates an amount of money to be shared among the upstream oligopolists in
proportion to their input production. In the ﬁrst stage, the upstream oligopolists
choose non cooperatively the amount of input they supply, in order to maximize
the amount of money obtained from their input sales. The two approaches
essentially diﬀer by the fact that, in the latter, the input price does not obtain
through the market clearing condition while it does in the former. Here, the
input price, expressed in monetary units, is equal to the ratio between the
total amount of bids oﬀered by the downstream ﬁrms, and the total amount of
input supplied by the upstream ones. As discovered below, this approach leads
to diﬀerent market outcomes than those observed in the traditional approach,
when successive oligopolies operate through the usual price mechanism, as in
Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006). Consequently, it naturally invites to contrast the
diﬀerences between the regime resulting from the just described market game
approach, -we call it the market game regime- ,and the regime analysed in the
latter paper, which relies on the traditional theory of successive markets; we
call the latter the market regime. In particular, it invites to compare the size of
the double marginalisation resulting from each of these alternative regimes.
In the prototype examples considered here and in the above G-Z paper,
the comparison between the two regimes leads to the following conclusions: (i)
the two regimes generate diﬀerent market outcomes, with a diﬀerent double
marginalisation under the market game and the market regimes; (ii) even if the
market outcomes are diﬀerent, the two regimes converge to the same outcome
under unlimited entry in the input sector, both in the case of decreasing and
constant returns; (iii) as in the traditional theory, and in spite of diﬀerent
outcomes, the market game approach does not prevent that, under decreasing
returns, free entry in both markets also entails that the usual tendency for the
input price to adjust to its marginal cost no longer holds, while it still does
under constant returns.
It is a matter of taste to decide which of the two approaches is the most
appropriate. The traditional approach, introduced by Spengler (1950), beneﬁts
from its repeated use in the analysis of vertical collusive agreements (see, for in-
stance, Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Van Long (1996), Ordover et al (1990),
or in Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006)). The strategic market game approach oﬀers
the advantage of discarding the awkward assumption, implicit in the traditional
analysis, that an auctioneer has to choose the upstream market clearing price.
In both cases, a sequentiality is introduced in the decisions of the oligopolists.
In the former, upstream oligopolists play the ﬁrst, using for evaluating their
payoﬀ the input price resulting from the equality of their total supply with the
input demands of the downstream oligopolists. In the latter procedure, up-
stream oligopolists are also the ﬁrst to play, but now they use the bids selected
by the downstream ﬁrms in the second stage game for guiding their decisions.
Finally, the present paper shows that the two regimes, while being diﬀerent for
3a small number of ﬁrms and built on diﬀerent assumptions, lead generally to
similar results when the economy expands through entry, and even coincide at
the limit.
2 The model
We consider two markets, the downstream and upstream markets, with n down-
stream ﬁrms i,i = 1,...n, in the ﬁrst producing the output, and m upstream ﬁrms
j, j = 1,...m, in the second, producing the input, and selling it in exchange of
money . The n downstream ﬁrms face a demand function π(Q) in the down-
stream market, with Q denoting aggregate output. Firm i owns technology fi(z)
to produce the output, with z denoting the quantity of the sole input used in
the production process. The m upstream ﬁrms each produce the input z at a
total cost Cj(z),j = 1,..,m.
We assume that this situation gives rise to a two stage sequential game. In
the ﬁrst stage, the active players are the m upstream ﬁrms with input supply
strategies sj. They aim at maximizing the amount of money they obtain from
their input sales. The players in the second stage game are the n downstream
ﬁrms with money bidding strategies bi. They aim at maximizing their proﬁt
by obtaining through their bids the quantity of input required to produce their
Cournot equilibrium quantity in the downstream market. The two markets are








k=1bk constitutes the fraction of total input supply S, obtained by ﬁrm
i through its bidding strategy bi.
Given a total input supply S, the payoﬀ in the second stage game for the ith


















Given these payoﬀs, and a total supply S in the input market, the best reply,
bi(b−i(S)) of ﬁrm i in the second stage game obtains as a solution (whenever it




A Nash equilibrium in the second stage game, conditional on a total input
supply S, is a vector of strategies (b∗
1(S),...,b∗




4In the ﬁrst stage game, upstream ﬁrms select their supply strategies sj,
j = 1,..,m. Given a n-tuple of supply strategies (s1,...,sj,..,sm) and a vector
of downstream ﬁrms’ bids (b1,...,bn) in the second stage game, the amount of







which constitutes the payoﬀ function of the jth-upstream ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage
game, conditional on the vector of bids (b1,...,bn) chosen by the downstream
ﬁrms in the second stage. Denote by (s∗
1,...,s∗
m) a Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst-
stage game, conditional on the vector of bids (b1,...,bn). A subgame-perfect




m) such that (i)
(b∗
1,...,b∗
n;S∗) is a Nash equilibrium conditional on S∗ in the second-stage game,




n) is a Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage game
conditional on the vector of bids (b∗
1,...,b∗
n).
3 Exploring subgame perfect equilibria
It is diﬃcult to analyze subgame perfect equilibria at the full level of gener-
ality underlying the above model. This is why, as in Gabszewicz and Zanaj
(2006), and in view of comparing our analysis with the latter paper, we explore
the properties of subgame equilibria by looking at the same two prototype ex-
amples. The ﬁrst corresponds to a situation in which downstream ﬁrms are
endowed with a decreasing returns technology while the second is characterized
by constant returns. Furthermore, we assume in both examples a linear demand
function in the downstream market, as in Salinger (1988), Gaudet and Van Long
(1996) and Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006). We also assume that ﬁrms operating
in the upstream (resp. downstream) market are all identical. Entry and com-
petition are analyzed through the asymptotic properties of the subgame-perfect
equilibrium when the number of ﬁrms in the markets is increased by expand-
ing the economy, as in Debreu and Scarf (1963). The two examples are now
successively considered.
3.1 Decreasing returns
The n downstream ﬁrms are assumed to face a linear demand π(Q) = 1 − Q in
the downstream market. They share the same technology f(z) to produce the
output, namely
q = f(z) = z
1
2.
The m upstream ﬁrms each produce the input z at the same linear total cost
Cj(sj) = βsj, j = 1,..,m.
When the m upstream ﬁrms have selected a total amount of input S =
Σn
h=1bh in the ﬁrst stage game, the payoﬀs of the ith downstream ﬁrm in the
second stage game conditional on S, at the vector of bidding strategies (bi,b−i),
writes as



















with B0 = Σh6=ibh. Using ﬁrst order conditions, the symmetric Nash equilibrium
in the second stage game conditional on S obtains as
b∗







In the ﬁrst stage, the payoﬀ Γj of the jth upstream ﬁrm at the vector of




sj + S0 sj − βsj.
with S0 = Σh6=jsh and S = Σn
h=1bh. At the symmetric subgame perfect equilib-
rium, we know that
Σn












n − (S0 + sj)
2(sj + S0)
sj − βsj.
From the ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient conditions and symmetry, we get
that
s∗
j = s∗ =
(2m − 1)2(n − 1)2
4nm3(2β + n − 1)2,j = 1,..,m,
which constitutes the individual supply of input by each upstream ﬁrm at the
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Substituting this value in b∗(S∗), with S∗ = ms∗, we get
b∗(S∗) =
(n − 1)
2 (2m − 1)(4mβ + n − 1)
8n2m2 (2β + n − 1)
2 ,
which is the bidding strategy played by each downstream ﬁrm at the Nash equi-
librium conditional on S∗ = ms∗ in the second stage game. Acccordingly, the
(n+m)-vector (b∗(S∗),..,b∗(S∗);s∗,..,s∗) constitutes, under decreasing returns,
the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game.
In order to compare the double marginalisation arising at the subgame
perfect equilibrium described above, with the one arising in the G-Z-paper,
we compute the output price in the downstream market resulting from the
6symmetric subgame equilibrium we have just identiﬁed. At this equilibrium,













2nm(2β+n−1). Substituting this value in the demand function π(Q) = 1 − Q,
we get the output price π∗ corresponding to the subgame perfect equilibrium,
namely,
π∗ =
4mβ + n − 1
2m(2β + n − 1)
A direct comparison between π∗ and the output price obtained at equilibrium
in G-Z, namely,
4mβ+n−1
2(2m−1) , shows that
Proposition 1 Under decreasing returns, the double marginalisation observed
in the mqrket mechanism model of successive oligopolies exceeds the one arising
at the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in the market game model.
A surprising outcome obtained at equilibrium in the traditional model is
that, under decreasing returns, when both the number of upstream and down-
stream ﬁrms tend simultaneously and in the same proportion to inﬁnity, the
equilibrium input price does not converge to the upstream ﬁrms’ marginal cost,
but exceeds it by an amount which decreases with the ratio of the number of
ﬁrms in each market ( n
m). In the market game model, the counterpart of the in-





h=1sh between the total money bids of downstream ﬁrms
and the total input supply proposed by the upstream ones. At equilibrium this
ratio is equal to
(4mβ+n−1)
2(2m−1) . Multiplying by k each value of n and m in this
expression, we get
p∗(k) =
4kmβ + kn − 1
4km − 2
,
which does not tend to the input marginal cost β when k tends to inﬁnity. Thus
we may state the following
Proposition 2 Under decreasing returns, and as in the market mechanism
model, when both the number of upstream and downstream ﬁrms tend simul-
taneously to inﬁnity, the equilibrium input price does not converge to upstream
ﬁrms’ marginal cost, but exceeds it by an amount which decreases with the ratio
of the number of ﬁrms n
m.
Another striking observation revealed in the G-Z analysis is that, under
decreasing returns, the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrms does not always increase
with the number of upstream ﬁrms, in spite of the increase in competition
resulting from entry in the upstream market. In particular, it is shown there
that, when n > 3, the proﬁt of a downstream ﬁrm always decreases as the




7is satisﬁed. Substituting the values b∗(S∗) and s∗ in the payoﬀ Πi of each
downstream ﬁrm at equilibrium, it is easily checked that, whatever the positive
value of β, the derivative ∂Πi
∂m is always positive: as intuitively expected, and
contrary to the procedure analyzed in G-Z, more competition in the upstream
market here always entails an increase in proﬁt for the downstream ﬁrms.
3.2 Constant returns
Assume now that downstream ﬁrms still face a linear demand π(Q) = 1 − Q
but now use a constant returns technology to produce the output:
f(z) = αz, α > 0.
The proﬁts Πi(bi,b−i;S) of the ith downstream ﬁrm at the vector of strategies
(bi,b−i) and S now obtains as
Πi(bi,b−i;S) = (1 − α
bi










Solving the maximisation problem of a downstream ﬁrm and using symme-
try, we get at equilibrium
b∗(S) =
(1 − Sα)(n − 1)Sα
n2
Hence, the payoﬀ Γj of an upstream ﬁrm at the ﬁrst stage of the game, after
substituting for b∗,obtains as
Γj(s,s−j) =
(1 − (sj + S0)α)(n − 1)(sj + S0)α
(sj + S0)
sj − βsj.
Maximising Γj(s,s−j), yields at the symmetric equilibrium
s∗ =
(nα − α − nβ)
(n − 1)(m + 1)α2.
Hence the optimal quantity of money b∗(S∗) that each downstream ﬁrm bids
obtains by substituting s∗ in b(sj,s−j), namely,
b∗(S∗) =
(α − nα − mnβ)(α − nα + nβ)m
α2n2 (n − 1)(m + 1)
2 .








n(α + mβ) − α
α(m + 1)n
.
8Accordingly, the (n + m)-vector (b∗(S∗),..,b∗(S∗);s∗,..,s∗) constitutes, under
constant returns, the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential
game.
In order for this vector to be an equilibrium, it is also required that the
values b∗(S∗) and s∗ to be both positive. These two inequalities are both si-





holds. This condition coincides with the condition which guarantees that both
upstream and downstream ﬁrms make positive proﬁts. Notice that this condi-
tion is slightly stronger than the condition required to be satisﬁed in the tradi-
tional model, which simply boils down to α ≥ β. The reason for this strength-
ening should be found in the indirect strategic power that downstream ﬁrms
exert in the upstream market : they inﬂuence the amount of input sales via
their money bids, and this inﬂuence fades away when the number n of down-
stream ﬁrms increases. In the traditional model, this inﬂuence does not exist
since downstream ﬁrms take the input price as given when buying the input2.
The two approaches - the market mechanism approach, or the market games
approach, - mainly diﬀer according to how downstream ﬁrms’ total production
costs are introduced in the model. In the market mechanism approach, these
costs depend on the input price and the quantity of input invested in produc-
tion. In the market game approach, total costs do not depend on the quantity
of input invested in the production, but reduces to a lump-sum amount corre-
sponding to the bid oﬀered by the downstream in exchange of its input share.
Nothing prevents to deduce from it a notion of average cost (and marginal cost
in the case of constant returns) simply by dividing the bid by the number of
output units produced. Using this notion, it easy to show that, when the econ-
omy is replicated k−times, increasing thereby simultaneously the number of
downstream and upstream ﬁrms, both the input and output prices converge to
their competitive values, β and
β
α, respectively. We summarize the above in the
following
Proposition 3 Under constant returns and whatever the regime, market or
market game, both the input and output prices tend to their competitive coun-
terparts when the economy is replicated at the same speed in the upstream and
the downstream markets.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the size of the double marginalisation
eﬀect under the two regimes. This can easily be done by directly comparing the
equilibrium per downstream ﬁrm output production levels into the two regimes.
We obtain the following
2A similar condition appears in another,but close, context (see Gabszewicz and Michel
(1997)). These authors analyse the oligopoly equilibrium of a market game with exchange and
production.
9Proposition 4 Under constant returns, the double marginalisation observed in
the market game regime exceeds the one arising at the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in the market regime.
Notice the crucial role played by the technology linking the input and the
output markets: with constant returns, the double marginalization eﬀect is
larger under the market game regime than under the market regime, while the
reverse holds under decreasing returns!
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we clarify how entry aﬀects successive markets when the technol-
ogy linking these markets is made explicit and the concept of market game is
used to describe the economic outcome of the downstream and upstream ﬁrms’
interaction. We have diﬀerentiated the eﬀects of entry in these markets accord-
ing to the nature of the technology : constant and decreasing returns, making
explicit several properties which diﬀer in each of these cases. Moreover, we have
highlighted how double marginalization is inﬂuenced by the technology used to
produce the output.
Our exploration of industry equilibria departs from the existing literature
because it does not start from the assumption of price taking agents in the de-
mand side of the markets. In particular, it does not assume that downstream
ﬁrms behave as price-takers in the upstream market, an awkward assumption
because it is diﬃcult to justify the fact that an economic agent behaves strategi-
cally in one market but not in the other. A reasonable treatment thus requires
downstream ﬁrms behaving strategically simultaneously in the downstream and
upstream markets. This is what we provide in this paper since the ﬁrms are
strategic in both stages of the game, i.e, in the downstream and upstream mar-
kets.
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